Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ Discrimination Unlawful Sex Discrimination by Turner, Ronald
Indiana Law Journal 
Volume 95 Issue 1 Article 6 
Winter 2020 
Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ Discrimination 
Unlawful Sex Discrimination 
Ronald Turner 
University of Houston Law Center, rturner@central.uh.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Labor and 
Employment Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Turner, Ronald (2020) "Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ Discrimination Unlawful Sex 
Discrimination," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 95 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol95/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law 
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ 
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact 
wattn@indiana.edu. 
  
Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ 
Discrimination Unlawful Sex Discrimination? 
RONALD TURNER* 
This Article examines recent circuit-split-creating federal appeals courts’ decisions 
interpreting and applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition of 
sex discrimination in unenvisaged cases presenting an issue not contemplated by the 
United States Congress when it enacted the statute: is anti-LGBTQ discrimination 
unlawful sex discrimination? Whether sexual-orientation discrimination constitutes 
sex discrimination has been answered in the affirmative by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of 
Indiana and the Second Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., and in the negative 
by the Eleventh Circuit in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Education. In EEOC 
v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff 
could pursue her transgender-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination claim; 
thereafter, the Fifth Circuit’s Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company decision held that 
binding circuit precedent foreclosed such an action.  
This Article discusses the interpretive approaches chosen and applied by courts 
and individual judges in recognizing or rejecting Title VII anti-LGBTQ 
discrimination claims, with special reference to (1) the meaning of Title VII’s 
“because of sex” prohibition, (2) the Supreme Court’s and circuit courts’ 
construction of the sex discrimination provision in the context of sex stereotyping 
and gender nonconformity discrimination as applied to the anti-LGBTQ 
discrimination question, and (3) associational discrimination theory. This Article 
concludes that judicial recognition of anti-LGBTQ claims best comports with Title 
VII’s sex discrimination ban as interpreted over the years by the Supreme Court and 
more recently in Hively, Zarda, and R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes. Is anti-LGBTQ 
discrimination unlawful sex discrimination? Yes.  
INTRODUCTION 
The year is 1964. The United States Congress has enacted the Civil Rights Act, a 
landmark statute that includes in Title VII a ban on employment discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, national origin, and a last-minute addition to the 
statutory text: sex.1 In the years and decades following the passage of Title VII, the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the sex discrimination ban 
in a number of contexts involving allegations that certain employer practices and 
conduct unlawfully discriminated against individuals on the basis of sex, such as 
employer policies denying employment to women with pre-school-age children, 
requiring women to make higher pension plan contributions than men, and providing 
pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits to female employees but not female 
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spouses of male employees.2 The Court has also held that workplace sexual 
harassment, including male-on-male harassment, violates Title VII and that 
discrimination against an employee because she did not conform to the employer’s 
gender stereotypes is sex-based discrimination prohibited by the statute.3  
The year is 2017. In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed and 
answered in the affirmative the question whether Title VII’s sex discrimination 
proscription encompasses sexual-orientation discrimination.4 The next year, the 
Second Circuit, in its en banc decision in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,5 held that 
sexual-orientation discrimination is a function of, and therefore discriminates on the 
basis of, sex. Shortly thereafter, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc,6 the Sixth Circuit ruled that a plaintiff could pursue her Title VII transgender 
discrimination against her employer. Two months later, in Bostock v. Clayton County 
Board of Commissioners,7 the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit 
sexual-orientation discrimination. And most recently, the Fifth Circuit’s Wittmer v. 
Phillips 66 Company decision held that 1979 circuit precedent foreclosed Title VII 
sexual-orientation discrimination claims.8 
This Article examines the aforementioned circuit-split-creating decisions’ 
interpretations and applications of Title VII’s “because of sex” provision in 
unenvisaged cases presenting an issue not anticipated by the 88th Congress when it 
enacted Title VII in 1964: does Title VII prohibit anti-LGTBQ discrimination? An 
unenvisaged case arises when a statute enacted to address and regulate a particular 
subject is said to apply to another subject not considered or foreseen by the enacting 
legislature. In the words of H.L.A. Hart, a legislature’s “inability to anticipate brings 
with it a relative indeterminacy of aim.”9 Unlike the “paradigm, clear cases” in which 
the legislative aim “is so far determinate because we have made a certain choice,” 
the aim in the unenvisaged case is indeterminate as “[w]e have not settled, because 
we have not anticipated, the question which will be raised by the unenvisaged case 
when it occurs . . . .”10 When that case arises, “we confront the issues at stake and 
can then settle the question by choosing between the competing interests in the way 
which best satisfies us,” thereby settling the question “as to the meaning, for the 
purposes of this rule, of a general word.”11  
In performing this settlement function in the “age of statutes,”12 the federal 
judiciary has selected from a menu of interpretive options and methodologies, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. See infra Section I.A. 
 3. See infra Sections I.B, I.C. 
 4. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 5. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 6. 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 7. 723 Fed. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), reh’g en banc denied, 894 F.3d 
1335 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 8. 915 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (3d ed. 2012). 
 10. Id. at 129. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUES (1982) 
(stating that the American legal system has fundamentally changed to a system primarily 
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including intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, and deference to administrative 
agencies. A judge’s selection is of obvious importance to the analyses of and the 
outcomes reached in cases. Hence the perennial question: how should judges decide 
cases in which parties contest the meaning of a statute? Should judges “look within 
the statute they interpret and outside it” and “turn to legal understandings that precede 
the statute, postdate it, and coincide with its enactment” and “draw on overarching, 
abstract principles”?13 Or should the judicial search for a, or the, meaning of the at-
issue text be restricted to then extant sources at the time of the statute’s enactment?  
As discussed herein, courts and individual judges recognizing or not finding 
actionable Title VII anti-LGBTQ14 claims have offered different rationales in support 
of their conflicting positions, including three justifications discussed in this project: 
(1) the meaning of Title VII’s “because of sex” prohibition, (2) the Supreme Court’s 
and circuit courts’ construction of the “because of sex” provision in the context of 
sex stereotyping and gender nonconformity discrimination as applied to the anti-
LGBTQ question, and (3) associational discrimination theory. Claim-recognizing 
jurists have looked to Title VII’s text, Supreme Court and circuit court precedent, 
and the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 
supporting their position. Those rejecting the argument that Title VII covers anti-
LGBTQ discrimination have focused on a posited original public meaning of the 
statute’s text circa 1964 and relied on circuit court precedents holding that sexual 
orientation and transgender discrimination claims are not cognizable under the 
statute. Both sides of the debate are catalogued and critiqued herein. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. As a prefatory matter, Part I discusses the 
last-minute addition of the word “sex” to the list of characteristics protected from 
discrimination in H.R. 7152, the proposed Civil Rights Act, and the path leading to 
the sex amendment’s inclusion in the legislation signed into law by President Lyndon 
B. Johnson on July 2, 1964. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
the statute’s “because of sex” prohibition, focusing on the Court’s initial sex 
discrimination decisions and its subsequent recognition of unenvisaged causes of 
                                                                                                                 
 
governed by legislatively enacted statutes, creating an “age of statutes”). 
 13. Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 596 (2017). 
 14. “LGBTQ” refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer. “LGB” refers to 
sexual orientation, the “emotional, romantic and/or sexual attractions of men to women or 
women to men (heterosexual), of women to women or men to men (homosexual), or by men 
or women to both sexes (bisexual).” Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/index [https://perma.cc/8XWT-M894]. This change 
has been implemented throughout the remainder of this Article. “T” refers to transgender or 
gender nonconforming, “an umbrella term for people whose gender identity or gender 
expression does not conform to that typically associated with the sex to which they were 
assigned at birth.” Id. “Q” refers to queer, an “adjective used by some people . . . whose sexual 
orientation is not exclusively heterosexual (e.g., queer person, queer woman).” GLAAD Media 
Reference Guide – Lesbian / Gay / Bisexual Glossary of Terms, GLAAD, 
https://www.glaad.org/reference/lgbtq [https://perma.cc/TK38-5AH4]. For persons 
identifying as queer “the terms lesbian, gay, and bisexual are perceived to be too limiting 
and/or fraught with cultural connotations they feel don’t apply to them.” Id.; see also 
LGBTQIA Res. Ctr., LGBTQIA Resource Center Glossary, UCDAVIS, 
https://lgbtqia.ucdavis.edu/educated/glossary [https://perma.cc/P9JE-52WE] (stating that 
“LGBTQIA” refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual).  
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action for workplace sexual harassment, same-sex sexual harassment, and gender 
nonconformity discrimination. Part III addresses the question of whether sexual-
orientation discrimination violates Title VII’s sex discrimination ban and examines 
the justifications supporting and opposing statutory coverage in Hively, Zarda, and 
Bostock.  
Part IV turns to the separate and distinct issue of transgender discrimination and 
the Sixth and Fifth Circuits’ contrary holdings in G.R. and R.G. Funeral Homes 
(recognizing the claim) and Wittmer (foreclosing the claim). Part V concludes that 
the sexual-orientation-and-transgender-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination 
position is the better, if not best, interpretation and application of Title VII’s “because 
of sex” proscription. That view best comports with the language of the sex 
discrimination provision as construed by the Supreme Court, lower courts, and the 
EEOC and reflects a jurisprudential approach that does not render invisible 
significant legal and contextual changes occurring in the half century following the 
enactment of Title VII.  
I. THE SEX DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENT 
In 1964, the United States House of Representatives debated H.R. 7152, part of 
the proposed Civil Rights Act prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, or national origin. On February 8, the eighth and last day of that 
debate,15 Representative and House Rules Committee Chair Howard W. Smith, 
Democrat from Virginia, introduced a floor amendment proposing the addition of the 
word “sex” to the then-listed four categories of prohibited discrimination. The clerk 
announced the amendment (“After the word ‘religion,’ insert ‘sex.’”).16 The House 
“erupted in shock as the full import of the amendment sank in”17 and “[t]wo hours of 
pandemonium ensued.”18  
The standard account of the introduction of the sex amendment holds that Smith 
(an octogenarian racist and “die-hard opponent of integration and federal legislation 
to enforce civil rights for African Americans”)19 did so in an attempt “to scuttle the 
adoption of the Civil Rights Act”20 and make H.R. 7152 “so controversial that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO 
PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 146 (2014); GILLIAN 
THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES, AND FIFTY YEARS THAT CHANGED 
AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 1 (2016). 
 16. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115 (1985).  
 17. Id. 
 18. PURDUM, supra note 15, at 195. 
 19. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 139 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Lynch, 
J., dissenting); see also Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History 
of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55, 67 (2016); Mary Anne 
Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on 
Sex Discrimination, The Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2014). 
 20. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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eventually it would be voted down either in the House or the Senate.”21 Smith’s 
“purpose was to sink civil rights for blacks by adding a similar guarantee for women; 
although some congressmen would grant equal rights for men of both races, Smith 
was certain that they would never extend those rights to women.”22 Agreeing with 
that explanation for the amendment, Professor Catherine MacKinnon remarked that 
“sex discrimination in private employment was forbidden only in a last minute joking 
‘us boys’ attempt to defeat Title VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination” and that 
“this attempted reductio ad absurdum failed” as the bill was ultimately enacted into 
law.23 Speaking about the amendment after the enactment of Title VII, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr., the first chair of the EEOC, stated that Smith introduced the 
amendment to “‘create ridicule and confusion.’”24 And Herman Edelsberg, the 
EEOC’s 1965–1967 executive director, described the amendment as “a fluke . . . 
conceived out of wedlock.”25  
A different account describes the legislative path to the ultimate adoption of the 
sex discrimination amendment. In December 1963, the National Woman’s Party 
(NWP) unanimously adopted a resolution to add the word “sex” to H.R. 7152 and 
urged longtime NWP ally Smith to support the amendment.26 Supporters of the Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA)27 also campaigned to have “sex” added to the bill, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 16, at 116. 
 22. BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, KEEPER OF THE RULES: CONGRESSMAN HOWARD W. SMITH OF 
VIRGINIA 194 (1987). 
 23. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
1281, 1283–84 (1991); see also Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh 
Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 152 (1997) (stating that Smith’s amendment was “a last ditch effort 
to sink the Civil Rights Bill”); Cary Franklin, Inventing the Traditional Concept of Sex 
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 (2012) (“[L]egal commentators have generally 
characterized [Smith’s] intervention as a last-ditch, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to derail 
a piece of legislation to which he was fiercely opposed.”).  
 24. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1015 
(2015) (quoting Edith Evans Asbury, Protest Proposed on Women’s Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 1965, at 32). 
 25. Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public 
Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 
416 (2009).  
 26. The resolution, “notable for its implicit racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia,” 
stated that the bill would not “give protection against discrimination because of ‘race, color, 
religion, or national origins’ to a White Woman, a Woman of the Christian Religion, or a 
Woman of United States Origin.” ROSALIND ROSENBERG, JANE CROW: THE LIFE OF PAULI 
MURRAY 275 (2017) (quoting the National Woman’s Party December 16, 1963 resolution); 
see also SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 20 (2011) (“Some National Woman’s Party members marched to the 
segregationists beat. For them, equal rights for women would only be undermined by an 
association with black civil rights.”). 
 27. First introduced in Congress in 1923, see S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 65 CONG. REC. 150 
(1923), the ERA provided: “Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United 
States and every place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.” That language was changed in 1946 to include states: 
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
232 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:227 
 
Representatives Martha Griffiths, Democrat from Michigan, and Katherine St. 
George, Republican from New York, sought support from southern legislators. 
Believing that Smith (a sponsor of the ERA)28 could secure southern votes, Griffiths 
asked him to propose the amendment.29 “For Smith, it was a win/win strategy: either 
the sex amendment would defeat the Civil Rights Act—a regulation of private 
business which he opposed—or it would amount to the passage of the ERA—a 
measure that he had always supported.”30 
Smith advised bill manager Emmanuel Celler, Democrat from New York and 
chair of the House Judiciary Committee, that he would offer the “sex” amendment 
as the NWP was “serious about it.”31 Smith appeared on Meet the Press two weeks 
before proposing the amendment and was asked by reporter Elisabeth May Craig 
(who was also a NWP member)32 whether he intended to add “sex” to H.R. 7152. “I 
might do that,” he replied.33 Thus, Smith’s February 8 introduction of the amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 
any State on account of sex. Congress and the several States shall have power, within their 
respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” S.J. Res. 61, 79th 
Cong., 92 CONG. REC. 9223 (1946). Eleanor Roosevelt and other liberal Democrats opposed 
the ERA “largely because it threatened their proud legacy of progressive legislation to protect 
women in the workplace.” HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 137 (1990). For more on the ERA, see 
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of 
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15–23 (1995). In 1972, Congress proposed the ERA 
with a resolution that it be approved within seven years. It was ratified by thirty-five of the 
thirty-eight states required for adoption. In 1978 a new Congressional resolution extended the 
ratification deadline to June 30, 1982. No additional states voted for ratification. Most recently, 
Nevada approved the amendment in 2017 as did Illinois in 2018. In January 2019, the Virginia 
Senate voted for ratification and the measure was sent to the Virginia House of Delegates 
where it died after it failed to clear a House subcommittee. See Jenna Portnoy, ERA Bill Dies 
for Good in GOP-Controlled Virginia House of Delegates, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-house-kills-era-ratification 
-bill/2019/02/21/82920204-3560-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/U42E-2PN3].  
 28. In 1945, the NWP persuaded Smith to sponsor the ERA. As Virginia and other 
southern states provided the textile industry with cheap female labor, the NWP emphasized to 
Smith and other southern legislators that the ERA would strike down protective labor laws 
limiting the number of hours women could work. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 275. Thus,  
Smith may have had a secondary purpose in supporting the sex amendment. Southern industry, 
particularly textile mills such as those in Virginia, relied heavily on cheap female labor toiling 
in sweatshop conditions to remain profitable. Recently passed protective laws for women had 
endangered this exploitation. A sex amendment would strike down such sex-based legislation 
that hurt southern companies. As a result, Smith and other southern Democrats may have 
adopted a chivalrous pose to assist local businesses. By adding the sex amendment, the Judge 
apparently hoped either to defeat the bill or, if it passed, to assist southern businessmen.  
DIERENFIELD, supra note 22, at 194. 
 29. See ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 276. 
 30. Franke, supra note 27, at 23. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of 
Sex Discrimination in Title VII, 49 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 37, 44 (1983). 
 33. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 276. 
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“could not have come as a surprise”34 as he “had been dropping hints for weeks” that 
he would do just that.35 
The amendment was debated on the floor of the House of Representatives for two 
hours; all but one of the female members of the House spoke in favor of the 
addition.36 Representative Griffiths warned “a vote against this amendment today by 
a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his sister.”37 
Stating that “[i]t would be incredible to me that white men would be willing to place 
white women at such a disadvantage,” Griffiths also emphasized the need to protect 
African-American women from workplace sex discrimination, such as a black 
female dishwasher wishing to move from “a greasy spoon” to a “very good restaurant 
which employed only . . . white men” and “a colored woman political scientist” 
seeking a job at a college or university where a female political scientist had never 
been employed.38  
Representative St. George made clear her support for the amendment: 
We do not want special privilege. We do not need special privilege. We 
outlast you—we outlive you—we nag you to death. So why would we 
want special privileges? I believe that we can hold our own. We are 
entitled to this little crumb of equality. The addition of that little, 
terrifying word “s-e-x” will not hurt this legislation in any way. In fact, 
it will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it logical. 
It will make it right.39  
St. George noted the days “when women were chattels” and “belonged, first of all, 
to their fathers; then to their husbands or to their nearest male relative,” with “no 
command over their own property.”40 Another legislator, Edna Kelly, Democrat from 
New York, declared her “support and sponsorship of this amendment and of this bill” 
in “an endeavor to have all persons, men and women, possess the same rights and 
same opportunities.”41 Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Democrat from South 
Carolina, argued that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
and national origin but not sex would deny opportunity to “the white woman of 
mostly Anglo-Saxon or Christian heritage.”42  
Opposing the amendment, Representative Robert Griffin, Republican from 
Michigan, proposed an amendment that would have required a sworn statement by a 
female employee that her spouse was unemployed before she could file a sex 
discrimination claim.43 Griffin believed that his amendment “would not prevent or 
prohibit any married woman from working because her husband also has a job.”44 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. PURDUM, supra note 15, at 196. 
 35. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 2. 
 36. See Franke, supra note 27, at 23–24.  
 37. 110 CONG. REC. 2580 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffiths). 
 38. Id. at 2579, 2583.  
 39. Id. at 2580–81 (statement of Rep. St. George). 
 40. Id. at 2581. 
 41. Id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Kelly). 
 42. Id. at 2579 (statement of Rep. Rivers). 
 43. See id. at 2731 (statement of Rep. Griffin). 
 44. Id. 
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However, as noted by Professor Cary Franklin, “as a practical matter, it would permit 
employers to prefer male workers over married women, and thereby ensure that a 
woman who enjoyed the financial support of a husband could not lay out a claim to 
a job that might otherwise go to ‘an unemployed man with a family to support.’”45  
Bill manager, Representative Emanuel Celler, an opponent of both the “sex” 
amendment and the ERA, posed the following questions:  
Would male citizens be justified in insisting that women share with them 
the burdens of compulsory military service? What would become of 
traditional family relationships? What about alimony? Who would have 
the obligation of supporting whom? Would fathers rank equally with 
mothers in the right of custody to children? What would become of the 
crimes of rape and statutory rape? Would the Mann Act be invalidated? 
Would the many State and local provisions regulating working 
conditions and hours of employment for women be struck down?46 
Celler also spoke of the “delightful accord” in his home: “I usually have the last two 
words and those words are ‘Yes, dear.’”47  
Also opposing the amendment, Representative Edith Green, Democrat from 
Oregon and the author of the Equal Pay Act of 1963,48 argued that it would “clutter 
up the bill and it may later . . . be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some 
of the very people who today support it.”49 Fearing that she would be called an Uncle 
Tom or Aunt Jane, Green stated that race discrimination was a more serious problem 
than sex discrimination and that sex-specific workplace practices could be justified 
by biological differences between men and women.50 “For every discrimination that 
has been made against a woman in this country there has been 10 times as much 
discrimination against the Negro of this country.”51  
At the end of the two-hour debate, and with no hearings held, the House voted 
168–133 in favor of Smith’s sex amendment. H.R. 7152, as amended, passed the 
House by a 290–130 vote.52 When the bill came before the United States Senate, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Franklin, supra note 23, at 1323 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of 
Rep. Celler)). 
 46. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
 47. Id. at 2684. 
 48. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 30 (2016). The 
Equal Pay Act provides that an employer shall not discriminate “between employees on the 
basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays 
wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). Representative Green noted that male Representatives 
supporting the Title VII sex amendment had opposed the EPA when that legislation was 
debated a few months earlier. See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green). 
 49. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND 
XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3221 (1968). 
 50. See 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green). 
 51. Id. at 2581. 
 52. See Barzilay, supra note 19, at 94. “Of all the congressmen who spoke for the adoption 
of the sex amendment, all except one ultimately voted against the Act.” Id. at 95.  
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Everett Dirksen, Republican from Illinois and Senate minority leader, considered 
removing the word “sex” from the bill.53 Advised of that development, lawyer and 
activist Pauli Murray54 drafted a memorandum showing the parallels between race 
and sex discrimination and arguing that “the basic principle that the right to a job 
without discrimination is a fundamental and individual right.”55 If the “sex” 
amendment was removed from the legislation “both Negro and white women will 
share a common fate of discrimination, since it is exceedingly difficult for a Negro 
woman to determine whether or not she is being discriminated against because of 
race or sex.”56 Murray’s memorandum was distributed to Attorney General Robert 
F. Kennedy, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Senator Dirksen, Senator 
Margaret Chase Smith, Lady Bird Johnson, and others.57 Dirksen did urge the 
Republican Senate conference to strike the amendment; Senator Smith opposed that 
move, and the sex discrimination amendment remained in the bill.58  
After the longest continuous filibuster in Senate history, that body voted for the 
legislation. The House voted for the Senate version on July 2 and that same day 
President Lyndon B. Johnson (whose administration had opposed the sex 
amendment)59 signed the Civil Rights Act into law.60 With the passage of Title VII, 
“the modern law of sex discrimination got its statutory footing,” and “the parallelism 
the act established between various types of forbidden discrimination assured that 
concepts developed in one area would be used in others.”61 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. See PURDUM, supra note 15, at 254; ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 277. 
 54. For discussion of Murray’s life and work, see KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING 
THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 207–33 (2012); see also ROSENBERG, 
supra note 26; Duke Human Rights Ctr., Pauli Murray Project, 
https://paulimurrayproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/7PG4-48T3].  
 55. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 277 (quoting Memorandum from Pauli Murray in 
Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title VII (Equal Employment 
Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Sex (Apr. 14, 1964)) 
[hereinafter Murray memorandum] (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 56. Id. at 278 (quoting Murray memorandum); see also Pauli Murray & Mary O. 
Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
232, 243 (1965) (“If ‘sex’ had not been added to the equal employment opportunity provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Negro women would have shared with white women the 
common fate of discrimination since it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether a Negro 
woman is being discriminated against because of race or sex. Without the addition of ‘sex,’ 
Title VII would have protected only half the potential Negro work force.”). 
 57. See ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 279. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Brauer, supra note 32, at 46 (noting Deputy Attorney General Nicholas 
Katzenbach’s view that the amendment “might overburden the legislation”); see also HUGH 
DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 1960–1972, at 75 (1992) (noting Katzenbach’s opposition to the amendment). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 61. Paul Gewirtz, The Triumph and Transformation of Antidiscrimination Law, in RACE, 
LAW AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 110, 112 (Austin Sarat 
ed., 1997).  
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II. DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF SEX” 
In pertinent part, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of [an] 
individual’s . . . sex.”62 The Supreme Court has defined “[t]he words ‘because of’ 
[to] mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’”63 This causation standard requires “the 
plaintiff to show ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is, 
but for—the defendant’s conduct.”64 Beginning in 1991,65 Title VII plaintiffs 
alleging status-based (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) discrimination can 
satisfy a relaxed and lessened causation standard by “show[ing] that the motive to 
discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, 
lawful motives which were causative in the employer’s decision.”66  
Whether and how certain employer conduct violates the “because of sex” 
prohibition has been addressed by the Supreme Court in various contexts including 
those discussed in the following sections of this Part. 
A. Initial Supreme Court Rulings 
In its first Title VII sex discrimination ruling, Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corporation,67 the Court held that an employer policy denying employment to 
women but not men with pre-school-age children violated the statute’s requirement 
“that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective 
of their sex.”68 Interestingly, the Court also stated that conflicting family obligations 
demonstrated to be more relevant to a woman’s job performance could provide an 
employer with a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to a sex 
discrimination claim.69 A concurring Justice Thurgood Marshall did not agree that a 
BFOQ “could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast majority, 
with pre-school children have family responsibilities that interfere with job 
performance and that men do not usually have such responsibilities.”70 He feared that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 63. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quoting 1 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)).  
 64. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)); see also EEOC v. Abercrombie 
& Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (“‘[B]ecause of’ . . . typically imports, at a 
minimum, the traditional standard of but-for causation.”). 
 65. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 66. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343; see also Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2032; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”). 
 67. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). 
 68. Id. at 544.  
 69. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (stating that an employer does not discriminate when 
it hires and employs an employee “on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those 
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise”). 
 70. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
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the Court had “fallen into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards 
about the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress, however, 
sought just the opposite result.”71  
City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart72 held unlawful an 
employer policy requiring women to make pension plan contributions 14.84% higher 
than the contributions made by male employees, a practice resulting in lower take-
home pay for female workers with the same salaries as their male counterparts.73 The 
employer justified the contribution differential on the ground that, because women 
live longer than men, the cost of a pension for the average female retiree is greater 
than for the average male retiree since the average female retiree will receive more 
monthly pension payments. The Court held that this aspect of the policy violated 
Title VII. While it is unquestionably true that “[w]omen, as a class, do live longer 
than men,”74 the Court declared that Title VII focuses on the individual, and that in 
enacting the statute “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”75 Thus, “employment 
decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the 
characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a 
woman’s ability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons 
for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less.”76 Requiring a 
woman to contribute more to a pension plan “simply because . . . [she] is a woman, 
rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the 
Act”77 and “does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment 
of a person . . . which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”78  
Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was held not to be unlawful sex 
discrimination under Title VII in the Court’s 1977 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 
decision.79 Relying on Geduldig v. Aiello,80 the Court ruled that the plaintiffs made 
no showing that the employer invidiously or pretextually discriminated against 
members of one sex when it excluded pregnancy disability benefits from its disability 
benefits plan. “Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways 
significantly different from the typical covered disease or disability.”81 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. at 545. 
 72. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 73. Id. at 712. 
 74. Id. at 707. 
 75. Id. at 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th 
Cir. 1971)). 
 76. Id. at 707 (footnote omitted). 
 77. Id. at 711. 
 78. Id. (quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1174 (1971)).  
 79. 429 U.S. 125 (1977). 
 80. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy 
benefits from a disability benefits plan’s coverage did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497; 
see also U.S. CONST. amend., XIV, § 1. “The program divides potential recipients into two 
groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively 
female, the second includes members of both sexes.” Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20. 
 81. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136. 
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Congress quickly responded to and legislatively overruled Gilbert in the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).82 Thereafter, in Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,83 the Court held that the employer’s health 
insurance plan (amended on the effective date of the PDA) violated Title VII by 
providing pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits to female employees but not to 
the female spouses of male employees. “Such a practice would not pass the simple 
test of Title VII discrimination that we enunciated in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & 
Power v. Manhart for . . . male employee[s] with dependents [whom were treated] 
‘in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”84 Furthermore, and 
significantly, the Court opined that the fact that pre-enactment discussion of the PDA 
focused on female and not male employees did “not create a ‘negative inference’ 
limiting the scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment.”85 
Unenvisaged discrimination against male employees did not foreclose their cause of 
action. 
As can be seen in the aforementioned cases, the question whether alleged 
discrimination is unlawful discrimination “because of sex” was answered in the 
affirmative after the application of the “simple test” of whether the evidence 
demonstrated treatment of the plaintiff which but for her sex would have been 
different. Martin Marietta’s denial of employment to the female plaintiff pursuant to 
its policy of hiring men but not woman with pre-school-age children was because of 
her sex and would not have occurred if she was a man. Higher pension plan 
contributions women were required to pay, because their life expectancy, as a class, 
was longer than the life expectancy of men, also did not pass the simple “but for” 
test. Nor did an employer’s “because of sex” discrimination against men in the 
provision of pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits. In each instance, the at-issue 
disparate treatment of women and men would have been different but for their sex.  
B. Sexual Harassment 
In enacting Title VII in 1964, the 88th Congress did not contemplate that the 
statute’s sex discrimination prohibition banned workplace sexual harassment.86 As 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See Pub. L. No. 95-955, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(k)). The PDA provides, among other things, that “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the 
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions.” Id. 
 83. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
 84. Id. at 682–83 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978)). 
 85. Id. at 680. For additional Court decisions interpreting the PDA, see Young v. UPS, 
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 86. See, e.g., Trina Jones, Title VII at 50: Contemporary Challenges for U.S. Employment 
Discrimination Law, 6 ALA. CIV. R. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 45, 60 (2014) (Congress arguably 
did not contemplate a sexual harassment cause of action in 1964); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual 
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 346 
(1990) (“In all likelihood, the members of Congress would have been quite surprised to learn 
that they had contemplated including sexual harassment within the confines of sex 
discrimination—especially since the term ‘sexual harassment’ did not come into currency until 
the late 1970s.”).  
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discussed in this section, post-enactment developments charted a path that ultimately 
led to the Supreme Court’s recognition of that Title VII claim.  
In 1971 the EEOC issued agency decisions concluding that workplace racial and 
national origin harassment violated Title VII.87 That same year the Fifth Circuit, in 
Rogers v. EEOC, recognized a Title VII claim for racial and ethnic harassment, and 
concluded “employees’ psychological as well as economic fringes [were] statutorily 
entitled to protection from employer abuse.”88 Other court decisions in the 1970s 
held that Title VII prohibited racial,89 religious,90 and national origin harassment.91 
Sexual harassment, a term reportedly coined by Cornell University professors in 
early 1975,92 was judicially recognized as sex discrimination in Williams v. Saxbe93 
and Barnes v. Costle.94 Not all courts agreed with that view; however, one opined 
that a supervisor’s harassment was “nothing more than a personal proclivity, 
peculiarity, or mannerism . . . satisfying a personal urge.”95 
Activists and scholars challenged the view that sexual harassment did not violate 
Title VII. In May 1975, Working Women United held the first “Speak-Out on Sexual 
Harassment,”96 and Carroll Brodsky’s 1976 book The Harassed Worker97 discussed 
and defined sexual harassment. Catherine MacKinnon’s influential 1979 work 
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination argued that 
sexual harassment—“the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context 
of a relationship of unequal power” and “the use of power derived from one social 
sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another”—is sex discrimination 
proscribed by Title VII.98  
                                                                                                                 
 
 87.  EEOC Dec. No. 72-0679, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 441 (1971); EEOC Dec. 
No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (1971). 
 88. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). Circuit Judge Paul Hirsch Roney dissented, finding 
nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicating a congressional concern about whether 
an employer’s business was “environmentally attractive” to all employees or whether an 
individual employee “might be uncomfortable or have feelings of unhappiness in his 
employment. . . . Congress has simply not given this scope to its legislation.” Id. at 246 (Roney, 
J., dissenting). 
 89. E.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 
1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 90. E.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
 91. E.g., Cariddi v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam). 
 92. See FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 218–25 (2009) 
(sexual harassment was coined by Cornell professors Lin Farley, Susan Meyer, and Karen 
Sauvigné in early 1975); THOMAS, supra note 15, at 84. 
 93. 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976). 
 94. 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 95. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); see also 
Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (Title VII was 
“not intended to provide a federal tort remedy” for sexually-motivated attacks in the 
workplace), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 96. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685 n.2, 
1698–99 (1998). 
 97. CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (1976). 
 98. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF 
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Another significant development in sexual harassment law and policy occurred in 
1980 when the EEOC issued its Guidelines on Sex Discrimination and defined sexual 
harassment: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when 
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment.99  
In 1986, twenty-two years after the passage of Title VII, the Supreme Court 
recognized a Title VII hostile environment claim for supervisory sexual harassment 
in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.100 Justice William H. Rehnquist’s opinion 
for a unanimous Court stated, “Without question, when a supervisor sexually 
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor 
discriminate[s] on the basis of sex.”101 He rejected, for two reasons, the employer’s 
argument that Congress was only concerned with tangible economic barriers caused 
by discrimination and not with the psychological aspects of a work environment. 
“First, the language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ 
discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces 
a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women’ in employment.”102 Second, the EEOC’s Guidelines, while not 
controlling, drew “upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC 
precedent” and “fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic 
injury can violate Title VII.”103 Justice Rehnquist also cited the Fifth Circuit’s Rogers 
v. EEOC104 decision and other lower court rulings prohibiting racial, religious, and 
national origin harassment.105 “Nothing in Title VII suggests a hostile environment 
based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not likewise be prohibited.”106 
Meritor thus relied on statutory text, lower court decisions, and the EEOC’s 
Guidelines in recognizing as actionable hostile-environment sexual harassment 
claims. The Court was not persuaded by the employer’s argument that Title VII’s 
history and the circumstances of its enactment compelled the conclusion that sexual 
                                                                                                                 
 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979). 
 99. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). 
 100. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). A hostile work environment is one in which the challenged 
conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City 
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 101. Id. at 64 (alteration in original). 
 102. Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 103. Id. at 65. 
 104. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 105. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. 
 106. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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harassment was not “within the ambit of Congressional concern,”107 or by the amicus 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States’s position that a sexual harassment 
action was not justiciable because “Title VII does not contain an express provision 
concerning sexual harassment.”108  
Did a male employee’s allegation that other male employees sexually harassed 
him state an actionable Title VII claim? That was the question before the Court in 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.109 Seeking a negative answer from the 
Court, the employer argued that Congress would have drafted Title VII differently if 
it meant to cover same-sex sexual harassment; that the harassment issue “does not 
involve a difference between the sexes” or otherwise implicate the statute’s goal of 
equal employment opportunity for men and women; and that same-sex harassment 
“is an entirely separate area of concern that cannot and should not be grafted onto 
Title VII.”110  
Yet another unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that 
the same-sex sexual harassment claim was actionable. Noting that Title VII’s 
“because of sex” prohibition protects both men and women,111 he rejected a 
conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against a member of 
the employer’s own sex or race.112 “If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, 
we hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 
‘because of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person 
charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.”113 The “critical 
issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other 
sex are not exposed.”114 
In an important passage of his opinion Justice Scalia addressed head-on the 
argument that the scope of Title VII was limited to the concerns of members of 
Congress in 1964: 
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a 
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the 
coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Brief of Petitioner, Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979), 1985 WL 669769, at *14. 
 108. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief for the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979), 1985 
WL 669770, at *5. 
 109. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 110. Brief for Respondents, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 634147, at *17. 
 111. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 104 (2012) (“[T]here is no textual basis [in Title 
VII] for limiting its protections to women.”). 
 112. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78. 
 113. Id. at 79. 
 114. Id. at 80 (citation omitted). Professor David Schwartz has argued that the Court’s 
“emphasis on ‘because of sex’ as the touchstone of sex discrimination works against the 
exclusion of lesbians and gays. . . . Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is thus, 
in the plainest of language, discrimination on the basis of sex within the terms of Title VII.” 
David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?: The Causation Problem in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1789 (2002). 
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sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil 
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather 
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. 
Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the 
“terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes 
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that 
meets the statutory requirements.115  
Statutory text and the Court’s precedents controlled the outcome of the case. 
C. Sex Stereotyping and Gender Nonconformity Discrimination 
Any discussion of the Title VII term “sex” must consider the interpretive 
consequences of the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.116 Ann Hopkins unsuccessfully sought promotion to partner in Price 
Waterhouse’s Washington, D.C. office. Partners considering her bid praised her 
character and accomplishments and work with clients. However, partners also 
criticized Hopkins’s abrasiveness with staff members, criticized her use of profanity, 
described her as “macho,” suggested that she take “a course at a charm school,” and 
commented that she had “matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-
nosed [manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
[partner] candidate.”117 Another partner “delivered the coup de grace” when he 
advised Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”118 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a plurality opinion, concluded that Hopkins had 
been subjected to unlawful sex stereotyping and that gender119 had played a 
motivating part in the adverse employment decision she challenged. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 116. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). For more on this seminal decision, see generally THOMAS, supra 
note 15, at 127–47 (narrative of Plaintiff’s experience before, during, and after the case); Ann 
Hopkins, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Personal Account of a Sexual Discrimination 
Plaintiff, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357 (2005) (article written by the Plaintiff and her 
perspective on the case).  
 117. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Gender identity is “[o]ne’s innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both 
or neither—how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves. One’s gender 
identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth.” Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-and 
-definitions [https://perma.cc/6PAB-7W6R]. “[G]ender expressions might be defined and 
limited to those commonly associated with masculinity or femininity” and “be defined by 
those expressions that are socially group identified.” YURACKO, supra note 48, at 144. 
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In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one 
of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman. 
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not 
be, has acted on the basis of gender.120  
 Justice Brennan did not quarrel with the district court’s conclusion that a number 
of the partners’ comments about Hopkins demonstrated that she was subjected to sex 
stereotyping.121  
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n 
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”122  
While workplace remarks and actions based on such stereotypes do not inevitably 
establish that gender played a role in a particular employment decision, they “can 
certainly be evidence that gender played a part.”123 Remanding the case for further 
proceedings, Justice Brennan instructed that the relevant question to be answered 
was whether the partners who evaluated Hopkins “in sex-based terms would have 
criticized her as sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had been a man.”124 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring opinion agreed with the district 
court’s findings that a number of partners referred to Hopkins’s “failure to conform 
to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against her election to the 
partnership,” and that the partner responsible for informing Hopkins of the reasons 
her candidacy was placed on hold told her that her “‘professional’ problems would 
be solved if she would ‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”125 Hopkins thus “proved that Price 
Waterhouse ‘permitt[ed] stereotypical attitudes towards women to play a significant, 
though unquantifiable, role in its decision not to invite her to become a partner.’”126 
“At this point,” the Justice concluded, “Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it 
could go” and had “proved that participants in the process considered her failure to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). 
 121. Id. at 251. 
 122. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 258. On remand, the district court held that Price Waterhouse failed to show that 
it would have placed Hopkins’ partnership candidacy on hold even in the absence of the 
negative, sex-stereotyped evaluations she received. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 
1202 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  
 125. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
 126. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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conform to the stereotypes credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a 
substantial factor in the decision.”127  
As later described by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (who dissented in Price 
Waterhouse),128 six Justices in that case agreed that a plaintiff could prevail by 
showing that one of the traits prohibited by Title VII was a motivating or substantial 
factor in the employer’s decision.129 And a majority of the Price Waterhouse Court 
determined that a plaintiff who made that showing in a mixed-motives case (one 
involving both lawful and unlawful employer motives) shifted the burden of 
persuasion to the employer which could avoid liability by showing that it would have 
made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory factor. “In other words, 
the employer had to show that a discriminatory motive was not the but-for cause of 
the adverse employment action.”130 Congress responded to this aspect of Price 
Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,131 adding a lessened “motivating factor” 
causation standard as well as a limited affirmative defense applicable in mixed-
motives cases.132 
Price Waterhouse went beyond merely prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
an individual’s biological sex (male or female). Ann Hopkins was discriminated 
against not because she was a “woman per se,” but because she was, in the 
employer’s view, not “womanly enough.”133 “The Court’s seemingly simple 
declaration” that penalizing employees based on stereotypes about how they should 
behave “has been the most important development in sex discrimination 
jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII” and “has been responsible for dramatic 
expansions in how courts have interpreted the act’s coverage.”134 Whether that 
expansion includes Title VII coverage sexual orientation and transgender 
discrimination is discussed in the ensuing Parts.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII “creates no independent 
cause of action” for sex stereotyping and that evidence of sex stereotyping, while relevant to 
the issue of discriminatory intent, does not answer the question whether the plaintiff was 
harmed by discrimination). 
 129. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348 (2013) (citing Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion)). 
 130. Id. at 348. 
 131. Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)–(B) (2012) (stating that an employer 
making the same-decision showing in a mixed-motives case may be subject to declaratory and 
injunctive relief and may be required to pay certain attorney’s fees and costs; the plaintiff shall 
not receive a court order of reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or back pay). 
 133. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 134. YURACKO, supra note 48, at 5. 
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III. SEXUAL-ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION: BECAUSE OF SEX?  
Is sexual-orientation discrimination unlawful sex discrimination under and within 
the meaning of Title VII? In the decades following the enactment of the statute 
federal courts of appeals repeatedly answered no.135 For instance, in 1979 the Ninth 
Circuit held that Title VII “should not be judicially extended to include sexual 
preference such as homosexuality.”136 Ten years later, the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals”137 and, in 1996, 
the Fourth Circuit stated, “Title VII does not afford a cause of action for 
discrimination based upon sexual orientation.”138 
More recently, the question whether sexual-orientation discrimination is unlawful 
sex discrimination has been answered by the Seventh Circuit (yes),139 Second Circuit 
(yes),140 and Eleventh Circuit (no).141 This Part examines the various arguments 
made in these cases for and against the sexual-orientation-discrimination-is-sex-
discrimination position.  
A. “Because of Sex” 
1. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana 
In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,142 Kimberly Hively, who is 
openly lesbian, sued the college and alleged that her employment was terminated 
because of her sexual orientation. Dismissing her suit, the district court held that 
sexual orientation is not a protected category under Title VII.143 A Seventh Circuit 
panel, deeming itself bound by Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.144 and other circuit 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. See Evans v. Georgia Reg. Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017); Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 
2012); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income 
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 
332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063–64 
(9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 
F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
 136. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 137. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 138. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 139. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339. 
 140. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100. 
 141. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 142. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 143. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *3 (N.D. Ind. 
Mar. 3, 2015), rev’d, Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 144. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).  
246 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:227 
 
decisions, held that Hively’s sexual orientation claim was not actionable. Vacating 
that decision and rehearing the case en banc, the court reversed, holding that 
“discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”145  
Chief Judge Pamela Wood’s majority opinion remarked that the interpretive 
question before the court was not whether Title VII could be judicially amended to 
add sexual orientation to the statute’s prohibition of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin discrimination.146 “Obviously[,] that lies beyond our power.”147 
Rather, the issue was a pure question of statutory interpretation well within the 
judiciary’s competence: what does it mean to discriminate on the basis of sex, and is 
an action taken because of an individual’s sexual orientation a subset of a prohibited 
action taken because of sex?148 Noting Ivy Tech’s argument that Congress has 
frequently considered but has not added the words “sexual orientation” to Title 
VII,149 the Chief Judge responded that where a “statute is plain on its face[]” there is 
no need to resort to secondary sources, such as legislative history or unsuccessful 
efforts to change the law.150 And when a statute is not pellucid, “the best source for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 146. Id. at 343 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. For an affirmative answer to the latter question, see Katie R. Eyer, Statutory 
Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 77–78 (2019).  
 149. See, e.g., Equality Act, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017); Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th 
Cong. (2017); Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th 
Cong. (2015); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011); Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 
2005, H.R. 88, 109th Cong. (2005); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3285, 
108th Cong. (2003); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. 
(1999); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 1430, 103d Cong. (1994); Civil Rights 
Amendments Act of 1989, S. 47, 101st Cong. (1989); Civil Rights Protection Act of 1988, S. 
2109, 100th Cong. (1988); A Bill to Prohibit Employment Discrimination on the Basis of 
Sexual Orientation, S. 430, 98th Cong. (1983); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1981, H.R. 
1454, 97th Cong. (1981); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1977, H.R. 4794, 95th Cong. 
(1977); Civil Rights Amendments Act, H.R. 13019, 94th Cong. (1976); Civil Rights 
Amendments Act, H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975). In March 2019, the Equality Act (H.R. 5 and 
S. 788, 116th Cong.) was introduced in Congress. The legislation would, among other things, 
amend Title VII section 703(a) by striking “sex” and inserting “sex (including sexual 
orientation and gender identity).” If enacted, the bill would be the first federal statute 
prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQ persons. At least twenty-one states and the District 
of Columbia have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity. See Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/HM3L-
ZR56].  
 150. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343–44. Failed attempts to change a statute “can mean almost 
anything, ranging from the lack of necessity for a proposed change because the law already 
accomplishes the desired goal, to the undesirability of the change because a majority of the 
legislature is happy with the way the courts are currently interpreting the law, to the irrelevance 
of the non-enactment, when it is attributable to nothing more than legislative logrolling or 
gridlock that had nothing to do with [the] merits.” Id. Thus, “it is simply too difficult to draw 
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disambiguation is the broader context of the statute that the legislature—in this case, 
Congress—passed.”151  
Noting but assuming no duty to defer to the EEOC’s 2015 determination that Title 
VII’s sex discrimination prohibition encompasses sexual orientation 
discrimination,152 Chief Judge Wood was guided by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc. and Justice Scalia’s pronouncement that “statutory prohibitions often 
go beyond the principal evil[s] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.”153 “The Court could not have been clearer” 
Chief Judge Wood wrote: “the fact that the enacting Congress may not have 
anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand in the way of the 
provisions of the law that are on the books.”154  
It is thus “neither here nor there” that, in including “sex” as a prohibited basis for 
employment discrimination in 1964, Congress “may not have realized or understood 
the full scope of the words it chose. Indeed, in the years since 1964, Title VII has 
been understood to cover far more than the simple decision of an employer not to 
hire a woman for Job A, or a man for Job B.”155 The Court has held that the “because 
of sex” provision prohibits workplace sexual harassment, including same-sex sexual 
harassment;156 discrimination on the basis of actuarial assumptions about an 
individual’s longevity;157 and discrimination because of a person’s failure to conform 
to an employer’s gender stereotypes.158 While it is possible that these decisions 
would have surprised those serving in the 88th Congress, “experience with the law 
has led the Supreme Court to recognize that each of these examples is a covered form 
of sex discrimination.”159 
                                                                                                                 
 
a reliable inference from these truncated legislative initiatives to rest our opinion on them. The 
goalposts have been moving over the years, as the Supreme Court had shed more light on the 
scope of the language that already is in the statute: no sex discrimination.” Id. at 344 (emphasis 
in original). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4–5 (July 14, 2015) 
(citing Price Waterhouse and concluding that sexual-orientation discrimination premised on 
stereotypes, assumptions, norms, and expectations constitutes unlawful sex discrimination 
because the employee has been treated less favorably because of her sex); see also Macy v. 
Holder, EEOC No. 012012821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *9, *11 (Apr. 20, 2012) (intentional 
transgender discrimination “is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’” and therefore 
violates Title VII; this is so even though members of the 1964 enacting Congress “were likely 
not considering the problems of discrimination that were faced by transgender individuals . . . 
.”). Agency decisions prior to Baldwin and Macy did not assert jurisdiction over employees’ 
complaints alleging that they had been discriminated against because they were gay. See 
Johnson v. Frank, EEOC No. 05910850, 1991 WL 118760 (Dec. 19, 1991); Dillon v. Frank, 
EEOC No. 01900157, 1990 WL 1111074 (Feb. 14, 1990). 
 153. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 154. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 116–32 and accompanying text. 
 159. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. 
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In dissent, Judge Diane S. Sykes asked, “[i]s it even remotely plausible that in 
1964, when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable person competent in the English 
language would have understood that a law banning employment discrimination 
‘because of sex’ also banned discrimination because of sexual orientation? The 
answer is no, of course not.”160 Observing that Title VII does not define 
discrimination “because of sex[,]”161 she looked for the “original public meaning” of 
“sex” in dictionary definitions.162 In “1964—and now, for that matter—the word 
‘sex’ mean[t] biologically male or female; it d[id] not also refer to sexual 
orientation.”163 Accordingly, for a “fluent speaker of the English language—then and 
now—the ordinary meaning of the word ‘sex’ does not fairly include the concept of 
‘sexual orientation’” as the two terms are not interchangeable and do not overlap in 
meaning.164 
Judge Sykes’s original public meaning and dictionary-centered approach is 
problematic in several respects. First, who is, and how does one identify, the posited 
reasonable person competent in the English language? This reasonable person 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Id. at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Sykes invoked the “fundamental canon of 
statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Id. (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. 
Ct. 870, 876 (2014)). “Contemporary” means not now but at the time of the statute’s 
enactment. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 362–63. On judicial reliance on dictionaries in statutory interpretation, see 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 44 (2016) (“Increasingly, judges are turning to dictionaries as external 
evidence of what words might mean.”); id. at 59 (arguing that “the rule of law underpinning 
of the ordinary meaning rule suggests that the dictionary meaning of any term should normally 
be judged by current as well as historic dictionaries”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING 
STATUTES 43 (2014) (stating that dictionaries can be helpful in interpreting statutes “especially 
when dealing with . . . a word’s usage at the time of the law’s enactment”); SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 111, at 415–24 (discussing the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation). But 
see Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (dictionaries are 
“the last resort of the baffled judge”); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 200 
(2013) (“Dictionaries are mazes in which judges are soon lost. A dictionary-centered 
textualism is hopeless.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (a dictionary is a “museum of words 
. . . rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures”). 
 163. Hively, 853 F.3d at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Wood did not disagree 
with Judge Sykes’s statement that “sexual orientation” was not defined by dictionaries at or 
around the time of Title VII’s enactment. But “neither was . . . ‘sexual harassment’—a concept 
that, although it can be distinguished from ‘sex,’ has at least since 1986 been included by the 
Supreme Court under the umbrella of sex discrimination.” Id. at 350 n.5 (majority opinion).  
 164. Id. at 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Richard A. Posner, calling for a “judicial 
interpretive updating” approach, rejected what he called Judge Sykes’s “diehard originalist” 
argument. Id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring). In his view, the enactors of Title VII 
“understandably didn’t understand . . . how attitudes toward homosexuals would change in the 
following half century.” Id. at 357. He preferred that the court openly acknowledge that it was 
imposing a meaning of “sex discrimination” that would not have been accepted by Congress 
in 1964 rather than give “the impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th 
Congress (1963-1965)[] carrying out their wishes.” Id. 
2020] TITLE VII  AND THE UNENVISAGED CASE  249 
 
cannot be nonarbitrarily constructed[.] Is the person a he or a she? Does 
he or she live in the city or the country? How much education and of 
which kind has he or she had? How much information does he or she 
possess about the law in question and the reasons behind its 
promulgation, etc.?165  
The inquiry into what this constructed person supposedly knows is an exercise in 
interpretive creativity.  
As for Judge Sykes’s reliance on dictionaries, great caution should be exercised 
in determining the legal meaning of a statutory term by reference to dictionary 
definitions or other lexicographical sources. A posited dictionary-based meaning of 
the statutory term “sex,” based on a hypothetical reasonable person’s understanding 
and usage of the term, may not shed useful interpretive and applicative light on legal 
meaning and can render jurisprudentially irrelevant legislative, judicial, and 
administrative agency uses and understandings of that term. That posited meaning 
should not invisibilize and trump decades of judicial constructions of “sex” and the 
Title VII phrase “because of sex.”  
Second, and assuming for the sake of argument the interpretive relevance of 
dictionaries,166 Judge Sykes’s dictionary analysis is “incomplete, at best.”167 As 
Professor William Eskridge notes, the 1961 edition of Webster’s dictionary defined 
“sex” in three ways: (1) “sex as biology” (male or female); (2) “sex as gender” 
(masculine and feminine); and (3) “sex as sexuality” (“the whole sphere of behavior 
related even indirectly to the sexual functions and embracing all affectionate and 
pleasure-seeking conduct”).168 And other dictionaries in existence prior to the 
enactment of Title VII did not limit “sex” to biological males and females and 
included sex-as-gender and sex-as-sexuality definitions.169 All of which shows that 
“the meaning of ‘sex’ in 1964 was not as one-dimensional as Judge Sykes 
asserted.”170  
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 541 
(2013); see also Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 73 (2006) (“[T]he reasonable person of the law . . . is highly intelligent and 
educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle connections and inferences . . . [and] 
is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual structure of the law.”). 
 166. Judge Joel M. Flaum’s concurring opinion referred to dictionaries defining 
“homosexuality” as sexual attraction to persons of the same sex. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 
(Flaum, J., concurring). Noting that a person’s homosexuality cannot be considered without 
accounting for that person’s sex, he concluded that an employer discriminating against an 
employee because of that employee’s sexual attraction to a same-sex individual “is motivated, 
in part, by an enumerated trait, the employee’s sex. That is all an employee must show to 
successfully allege a Title VII claim.” Id. at 359. 
 167. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338 (2017). 
 168. Id. (citing and quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 2296 (2d unabridged ed. 1961)). 
 169. See id. at 338 n.63 (citing THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Clarence L. 
Barnhart ed. 1955)). 
 170. Id. at 339. 
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Third, it is noteworthy that congressional drafters “do not use dictionaries. 
Period.”171 This reality calls into question the view that “ordinary meaning is the 
right lodestar from which to chart an interpretive path for statutory language.”172 A 
court’s dictionary-based determination of a reasonable person’s understanding of a 
statutory term can import into the interpretive analysis sources not considered by 
those who drafted the legislation and its at-issue provisions.  
Fourth, Judge Sykes’s static and dictionary-based textualist approach does not 
take into account changes in linguistic usage and context. Consider “property,” a 
word that, in context, does not mean today what it meant in the past. At one time, 
“property”  
included a man’s right to his wife’s exclusive domestic and sexual 
services, to the management of her property and the dictation of her 
domicile, and to the labor of his children, apprentices, and . . . slaves, all 
protected by law against strangers who would appropriate or interfere 
with them . . . no lawyer or lay interpreter of the word ‘property’ would 
take it to include any of those rights today.173  
Like “property,” the meaning of the Title VII term “sex” is not and should not be 
restricted to a postulated frozen-in-time meaning with no consideration of post-
enactment linguistic usage, context, and judicial constructions.174  
2. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. 
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,175 Donald Zarda, a gay man, was employed as 
a skydiving instructor, a position in which he engaged in tandem skydives strapped 
shoulder-to-shoulder and hip-to-hip with clients. Seeking to assuage any concerns a 
female client may have had about being strapped to a male instructor, he told one 
female client that he was gay and “had an ex-husband to prove it.”176 Zarda was 
terminated after one dive when a female client alleged that he had inappropriately 
touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to her to excuse his behavior. Zarda 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: 
The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What They are Already Trying 
to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 206 (2017); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1318 (2018) (Congressional “drafters do not consult 
dictionaries when drafting”). 
 172. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst 
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 574 (2013). 
 173. ROBERT W. GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN 
LAW 367 (2017). With regard to the view that a wife was her husband’s property, recall 
Representative Katherine St. George’s statement during the 1964 House debates over the sex 
amendment to Title VII: “women were chattels” who “belonged, first of all, to their fathers; 
then to their husbands . . . .” 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (statement of Rep. St. George); see supra 
note 39 and accompanying text.  
 174. Francis J. Mootz III, Judging Well, 11 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 1, 26 (2018). 
 175. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 176. Id. at 108 (bracket and citation omitted). 
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brought a Title VII lawsuit alleging that he was fired because he failed to conform to 
male sex stereotypes when he referred to his sexual orientation. Granting summary 
judgment to the employer, the district court concluded that Zarda177 failed to establish 
a prima facie case of gender stereotyping. On appeal, a Second Circuit panel held 
that under the court’s precedents178 Zarda’s sexual-orientation discrimination claim 
was not cognizable.179 After rehearing en banc, the court affirmed in part, vacated in 
part, and remanded the case to the district court. 
Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann’s majority opinion focused on judicial 
precedent and the text of Title VII, in particular the phrase “because of sex” and 
Section 703(m)’s “motivating factor” causation standard.180 He observed that the 
Supreme Court has held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex 
itself, as well as “traits that are a function of sex, such as life expectancy . . . and 
nonconformity with gender norms . . . .”181 Citing Oncale, the Chief Judge reasoned 
that application of the statute to such traits is consistent with the Court’s view that 
Title VII covers both the principal evils with which Congress was concerned in 1964, 
as well as “reasonably comparable evils” meeting the statute’s requirements.182 
Chief Judge Katzmann then determined that the “most natural reading” of Title 
VII’s sex discrimination ban “is that it extends to sexual orientation . . . because sex 
is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.”183 Operationalizing the Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition of “sexual orientation” (a “person’s predisposition or 
inclination toward sexual activity or behavior with other males or females”)184 and 
citing Judge Flaum’s Hively concurrence,185 Chief Judge Katzmann opined that 
identifying a person’s sexual orientation requires knowledge of that person’s sex and 
the sex of the person he or she is attracted to; that double delineation led him to 
conclude that “sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a protected 
characteristic under Title VII . . . .”186 
Chief Judge Katzmann turned to the argument made by Judge Sykes in her Hively 
dissent: that it is not remotely plausible that in 1964 a reasonable person competent 
in the English language would have understood that Title VII’s sex discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. After filing suit, Zarda died in a jumping accident and the executors of his estate 
substituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 107 n.1. 
 178. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled by Zarda, 
883 F.3d 100; Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda, 883 F.3d 
100; see also Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(Katzmann, C.J., concurring) (expressing his view that the court should revisit Simonton and 
Dawson “especially in light of the changing legal landscape that has taken shape in the nearly 
two decades since Simonton issued”).  
 179. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), rehearing en banc 
granted May 25, 2017, aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2018) (en banc). 
 180. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112; supra note 132. 
 181. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112 (citations omitted). 
 182. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 113 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 185. Id. (citing Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring)); see supra note 166 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113. 
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ban also prohibited sexual-orientation discrimination.187 As did Chief Judge Wood 
in Hively, Chief Judge Katzmann responded that the same could be said of other 
forms of discrimination initially believed to fall outside of the statute’s protective 
umbrella and “not necessarily obvious from the face of the statute[,]”188 such as 
sexual harassment and unlawful hostile work environments. As Congress cannot 
anticipate “the full spectrum of employment discrimination that would be directed at 
the protected categories, it falls to courts to give effect to the broad language 
Congress used.”189  
Dissenting Judge Gerard E. Lynch’s analysis was premised on his understanding 
of the legislative commitment to the principles of the enacted words chosen by 
Congress, “illuminated by an understanding of the central public meaning of the 
language used in the statute at the time of its enactment.”190 Looking beyond the 
legislative history of the Title VII sex amendment191 to the broader political and 
social history of that provision, he argued that the sex discrimination ban “was 
intended to eliminate workplace inequalities that held women back from advancing 
in the economy,” just as the statute sought to protect African Americans and other 
racial, national, and religious minorities from workplace discrimination.192 The 
statutory language “would have been so understood” by members of Congress and 
“by any politically engaged citizen deciding whether to urge his or her 
representatives to vote for” the sex discrimination amendment.193 On the eve of the 
passage of historic legislation addressing racial discrimination against African 
Americans “women in effect stood up and said ‘us, too,’ and Congress agreed.”194  
Judge Lynch’s understanding of the “central public meaning” of Title VII at the 
time of its enactment introduces extratextual elements into the interpretive calculus: 
congressional intent, the political and social history of the sex discrimination 
amendment, the understanding of Members of Congress as well as politically 
engaged citizens (who they are is not specified), and congressional agreement with 
women who said (in effect and not in actuality) “us, too.” Judge Lynch’s focus and 
reliance on congressional intent is reminiscent of subjective intentionalism 
discredited by Justice Scalia and others,195 and the other elements he mentions are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. Id. at 114; see supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 188. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 114. 
 189. Id. at 115 (citation omitted). 
 190. Id. at 144 (footnote omitted) (Lynch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 143 (referring to 
the “fundamental public meaning of the language of the Civil Rights Act”) (emphasis in 
original). Judge Lynch also noted that the political context of proposed legislation and the way 
that language is or is not used in public debate can be helpful in understanding statutory 
meaning. See id. at 144 n.8.  
 191. See supra Part I. 
 192. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 145 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  
 195. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 111, at 30 (“describing the interpretive exercise as 
a search for ‘intent’ inevitably causes readers to think of subjective intent, as opposed to the 
objective words that the drafters agreed to in their expression of rights and duties”) (emphasis 
in original); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1259 (1999) (intentionalism has been discredited); Jane S. Schacter, The 
Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 
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rife with opportunities for interpreter discretion and judicial creativity not tethered to 
the language of the statute itself at the time of its enactment.  
Responding to Chief Judge Katzmann’s observation that Title VII prohibits 
certain conduct and practices not contemplated by Congress when the statute was 
enacted in 1964, Judge Lynch argued that unanticipated consequences do “not 
support extending Title VII by judicial construction to protect an entirely different 
category of people.”196 Outlawing sexual harassment and hostile work environments 
says nothing about whether the statute covers discrimination on other bases, he 
contended. The “political reality” is that Title VII does not mandate equal protection 
in the workplace; rather, the statute prohibits discrimination based on specified 
categories and classifications. Groups that successfully persuaded a majority of 
Congress that they should be protected from discriminatory treatment were included 
in the protected categories listed in the statute; those who did not achieve that 
political goal were not.197 Thus, he hypothesized, if Representative Smith’s “sex” 
amendment had been defeated Title VII would have only provided workplace 
protection on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. “But it would not 
have protected women,” a fact that would not have changed “without legislative 
action.”198 “Congress is permitted to choose what types of social problems to attack 
and by which means”; in 1964, it did not choose to prohibit sexual-orientation 
discrimination.199  
This counterfactual is not helpful. We know that Representative Smith’s 
amendment was not defeated and that Congress chose to prohibit discrimination 
“because of . . . sex.” The legal meaning of that phrase has not been frozen in amber 
such that cases unenvisaged and unanticipated in 1964 (for example, sexual 
harassment and hostile work environment claims) are beyond the statute’s scope and 
reach.  
3. Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of 
Commissioners200 reviewed a district court’s dismissal of Gerald Lynn Bostock’s 
sexual-orientation discrimination claim. In a four-paragraph per curiam opinion, the 
appeals court agreed with the district court that the case was governed by the Fifth 
Circuit’s pre-Price Waterhouse 1979 decision in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corporation 
holding that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . . .”201 
                                                                                                                 
 
110 (1995) (intentionalism “has long been discredited by scholars”). 
 196. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 145 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 197. See id. at 147. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 148. 
 200. 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), reh’g en banc denied, 894 F.3d 1335 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
 201. 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Blum was decided by the Eleventh 
Circuit’s predecessor, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Eleventh 
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued before the close 
of business on September 30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
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Blum’s binding status was also recently confirmed by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital.202  
B. Gender Nonconformity Discrimination 
1. Hively 
Viewing the sexual-orientation discrimination issue through the lens of gender 
nonconformity law, Chief Judge Wood wrote that Kimberly Hively “represents the 
ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in 
a place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other 
forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”203 That employers may 
not lawfully police the boundaries of behaviors acceptable for women was the critical 
point made by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins204 and by the 
Seventh Circuit in a 1971 decision wherein the court stated that Title VII applies to 
the “entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”205 Chief Judge Wood explained that in both of those cases the 
challenged employer actions did not affect every female employee. Likewise, a 
policy discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation “does not affect every 
woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). The Evans court 
deemed itself bound by Blum unless and until that decision was overruled by the Eleventh 
Circuit or the Supreme Court. Id. at 1255. Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., concurring, opined that 
although plaintiffs alleging gender nonconformity discrimination will often experience sexual-
orientation discrimination, under Title VII the only question asked is whether the individual 
experienced discrimination for deviating from a gender stereotype. Citing two magazine 
articles referring in the titles to the authors’ choice to be gay, Judge Pryor wrote, “Some gay 
individuals adopt what various commentators have referred to as the gay ‘social identity’ but 
experience a variety of sexual desires.” Id. at 1259 (Pryor, J., concurring) (citing E.J. Graff, 
What’s Wrong with Choosing to Be Gay?, NATION (Feb. 3, 2014), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/whats-wrong-choosing-be-gay/ [https://perma.cc/M787-
ML3A]). Drawing a line between the behavior and status of a person claiming gender 
nonconformity discrimination, Judge Pryor argued that Price Waterhouse concerned behavior 
and not status. “Status-based protections must stem from a separate doctrine or directly from 
the text of Title VII.” Id. at 1260. The statute’s enumeration of protected characteristics does 
not include sexual orientation and the argument that that status should be a protected class 
should be pressed in Congress and not in courts. See id. at 1260–61. Judge Pryor’s colleague, 
Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum, pointed out that his arbitrary line between behavior and status 
would protect an “outwardly lesbian plaintiff” but not a “lesbian who is private about her 
sexuality.” Id. at 1267 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
employer “smart enough to say only that it thought that the employee was a lesbian” could fire 
a female employee perceived to be a lesbian without identifying the basis for that conclusion. 
Id. This behavior-status analysis does not “comport with the lived experiences of gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual persons” and creates “‘fictional gays’ to justify excluding LGB people from Title 
VII’s protections.” Anthony Michael Kreis, Against Gay Potemkin Villages: Title VII and 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 96 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 8 (2017).  
 203. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 204. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); see supra Section I.C. 
 205. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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someone of a given sex.”206 When an employer acts on those assumptions it takes 
into account and has reacted to “the victim’s biological sex (either as observed at 
birth or as modified, in the case of transsexuals) . . . .”207 
Judge Sykes, dissenting, argued that Price Waterhouse only held that “sex 
stereotyping” can be evidence of sex discrimination and did not establish such 
stereotyping as a “doctrine” or “theory”208 or an independent cause of action.209 
Seeing nothing in Price Waterhouse casting doubt on the distinction between sex 
discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination, she thought it plain that 
“heterosexuality is not a female stereotype; it is not a male stereotype; it is not a sex-
specific stereotype at all.”210 
It is true that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse did not 
expressly label his sex-stereotyping analysis as doctrinal or theoretical or as 
establishing an independent cause of action. That does not change the fact that he 
clearly and unequivocally declared that employers cannot discriminatorily assume or 
insist that employees match their employers’ stereotypes.211 Nor does it invisiblize 
concurring Justice O’Connor’s conclusion in Price Waterhouse that Ann Hopkins 
proved that her employer’s sex stereotyping played a significant role in the decision 
not to invite her into the partnership.212 For these reasons, Judge Sykes’s observations 
do not fairly call into question the Court’s three-decades-old precedent as applied to 
the sexual-orientation discrimination issue.213 
2. Zarda 
Also viewing the sexual-orientation discrimination issue through the gender-
stereotyping/nonconformity lens, Chief Judge Katzmann argued that sexual-
orientation discrimination is “almost invariably rooted in stereotypes about men and 
women.”214 Applying Price Waterhouse, he concluded that when “‘an employer acts 
on the basis of a belief that men cannot be attracted to men, or that they must not be,’ 
but takes no action against women who are attracted to men, the employer ‘has acted 
on the basis of gender.’ . . . The gender stereotype at work here is that ‘real’ men 
should date women, and not other men.”215  
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346. 
 207. Id. at 346–47. 
 208. Id. at 369 (Sykes, J., dissenting). But see Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 
1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017) (referring to the Price Waterhouse “sex-
stereotyping theory”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting the 
Price Waterhouse “theory of sex stereotyping”).  
 209. Hively, 853 F.3d at 369 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. at 370. 
 211. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 213. For more on these points, see infra notes 312–15 and accompanying text. 
 214. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 215. Id. at 120–21 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)). 
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Amicus U.S. Department of Justice216 argued that Price Waterhouse does not 
prohibit sex-stereotyping/sexual-orientation discrimination because women are 
treated no worse than men. Reading Price Waterhouse in conjunction with Oncale, 
Chief Judge Katzmann responded that Price Waterhouse “could not have defended 
itself by claiming that it fired a gender-nonconforming man as well as a gender-
nonconforming woman any more than it could persuasively argue that two wrongs 
make a right.”217 The two wrongs would doubly violate Title VII in that both men 
and women would be discriminated against on the basis of gender stereotypes.218 
Dissenting Judge Lynch fully accepted the view that discrimination based on “a 
normative belief about how all women should be” imposes different working 
conditions on men and women and is therefore prohibited by Title VII: the systematic 
disadvantaging of one sex is the “key element” in the finding that sexual stereotyping 
is sex discrimination.219 But he did not agree that a homophobic employer’s 
stereotypes regarding men or women disadvantaged either sex. The homophobic 
employer who disapproves of the behavior of a class of persons including both men 
and women does not act on “a belief about what men or women ought to be or do; it 
is a belief about what all people ought to be or do—to be heterosexual and to have 
sexual attraction to or relations with only members of the opposite sex.”220 In his 
view, that kind of discrimination is not better or worse than other kinds of 
discrimination, but it is “something different from sex discrimination” and is 
therefore not prohibited by Title VII.221 
C. Associational Discrimination 
Another rationale offered by the Seventh and Second Circuits in support of 
recognition of a Title VII sexual-orientation discrimination claim likened such 
discrimination to the prohibition and criminalization of interracial marriages in 
Loving v. Virginia.222 In that canonical decision, issued three years after the 
enactment of Title VII, the Court invalidated Virginia’s white supremacist anti-
miscegenation laws.223 In doing so, the Court rejected Virginia’s argument that those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. The DOJ, supporting the employer, and the EEOC, supporting Zarda, submitted 
separate amicus briefs to the Second Circuit. Id. at 116 n.12. 
 217. Id. at 123. 
 218. See id. Chief Judge Katzmann also rejected the DOJ’s argument that an employer’s 
negative views about same-sex sexual attraction based not on gender but on its moral beliefs 
would not violate Title VII. That argument “merely begs the question by assuming that moral 
beliefs about sexual orientation can be disassociated from beliefs about sex. Because sexual 
orientation is a function of sex, this is simply impossible.” Id. at 122.  
 219. Id. at 158 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with Judge Lynch on this point, Chief 
Judge Katzmann noted that Title VII “does not ask whether a particular sex is discriminated 
against; it asks whether a particular ‘individual’ is discriminated against ‘because of such 
individual’s . . . sex.’” Id. at 123 n.23 (majority opinion). 
 220. Id. at 158 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. 
 222. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 223. “The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons 
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures 
designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Id. at 11. 
2020] TITLE VII  AND THE UNENVISAGED CASE  257 
 
laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution224 
since the interracial marriage proscription applied to both the African-American and 
white participants in the marriage. The “fact of equal application does not immunize 
the statute from the very heavy burden of justification” required by the Equal 
Protection Clause when government draws racial lines.225 
1. Hively 
Chief Judge Wood, invoking Loving, observed, “society understands now” that 
anti-miscegenation laws “are (and always were) inherently racist.”226 She compared 
interracial marriage bans and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: an 
African American discriminated against because of his or her marriage to a white 
person would not have been discriminated against if he or she had married an African 
American; a woman who had or preferred intimate relations with a woman would 
not be discriminated against if she had or preferred such a relationship with a man.227 
In the racial discrimination and Title VII context, courts have applied the 
associational discrimination theory in holding that employers engaging in such 
conduct unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race.228 In the sexual-orientation 
discrimination and Title VII context, courts should likewise apply the theory and 
hold that an adverse action based on the employer’s disapproval of same-sex 
associations discriminates against a plaintiff-employee because of her sex. 
Disagreeing with Chief Judge Wood’s invocation of Loving,229 Judge Sykes 
argued that the inherently racist anti-miscegenation laws at issue in Loving are 
different from sexual-orientation discrimination that is “not inherently sexist. No one 
argues that sexual-orientation discrimination aims to promote or perpetuate the 
supremacy of one sex.”230 This view, in the words of Professor Brian Soucek, is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. Id. at 12; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 225. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) 
(“Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end with a showing of equal 
application among the members of the class defined by the legislation. The courts must reach 
and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in 
light of its purpose . . . .”).  
 226. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 348 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 227. See id. at 349; see also Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (1992). 
 228. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 348 (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d 
Cir. 2008)) (“[W]here an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer 
disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the 
employee’s own race”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (a plaintiff’s discrimination claim “based upon an interracial marriage or 
association” alleges, “by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his 
race”); see also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(assuming for the sake of argument that an associational race discrimination claim is 
actionable where white employees brought a Title VII action alleging that they were subjected 
to a hostile work environment because they associated with African-American coworkers).  
 229. As did Judge Posner: in his view, Loving “had nothing to do with the recently enacted 
Title VII.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 356 (Posner, J., concurring).  
 230. Id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting). But see Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 
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“astonishingly, flamboyantly wrong.”231 As he notes, “it would be nearly impossible 
even to glance at the queer and gender theory or antidiscrimination scholarship of 
the last two decades without encountering the notion that sexual orientation 
discrimination has something to do with the subordination of women.”232 Sexism is 
“the ideology of male supremacy and superiority over women,”233 and men and boys 
use homophobic slurs to establish and enforce hierarchies in which women are at the 
bottom.234 In both the white-supremacist anti-miscegenation and male-supremacist 
sexual-orientation contexts, discrimination is triggered and fueled by disapproval of 
certain associations and relationships.  
2. Zarda 
Zarda agreed with the Seventh Circuit that employment discrimination based on 
an employee’s associations is discrimination on the basis of sex. The court had 
previously recognized associational discrimination as a violation of Title VII’s race 
discrimination prohibition in Holcomb v. Iona College235 as have other federal courts 
of appeals.236 In addition, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have extended the theory 
beyond race to claims of color, religion, sex, and national origin.237 Agreeing with 
those decisions, Chief Judge Katzmann declared, “we now hold that the prohibition 
on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes protected 
by Title VII, including sex.”238 He explained that if a male employee who is married 
to a man is fired because his employer disapproves of same-sex marriage, the 
employee “has suffered associational discrimination based on his own sex” because 
the employer was motivated by the fact that the employee is a man instead of a 
woman.239 The employer cannot avoid that conclusion by requiring men and women 
to refrain from same-sex relationships and attractions. If an African-American 
employee and his white wife, who was also an employee, were both fired for their 
association, it “is unthinkable” that the discrimination “would be excused because 
two employees of different races were both victims of an anti-miscegenation 
                                                                                                                 
 
100, 160 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (“It is certainly plausible to me that the ‘deep 
roots’ of hostility to homosexuals are in some way related to the same sorts of beliefs about 
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discrimination against women.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 711 
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 231. Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 115, 121 (2017). 
 232. Id.; see also id. at 123 n.36. 
 233. Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power”–The Role of Patriarchal Religion and 
Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 365, 380 (2008). 
 234. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Masculinity & Title IX: Bullying and Sexual Harassment 
of Boys in the American Liberal State, 73 MD. L. REV. 887, 965 (2014). 
 235. 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 236. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 124 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 237. See id. at 124–25 and cases cited therein. 
 238. Id. at 125. 
 239. Id.  
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workplace policy. The same is true of discrimination based on sexual orientation.”240 
Reinforcing this conclusion with the reasoning of Loving,241 the Chief Judge 
extended the Loving court’s rejection of the equal application defense242 to 
associations based on sex.243 
Amici supporting the employer argued that Loving and Holcomb should not be 
applied to same-sex relationships because anti-miscegenation policies are motivated 
by racism while sexual orientation discrimination is not rooted in sexism. And amici 
supporting Zarda contended that “sexual orientation discrimination has deep 
misogynistic roots.”244 Chief Judge Katzmann did not resolve this disagreement 
because the employer’s amici did not identify any cases liming the scope of Title 
VII’s sex discrimination ban to “discrimination motivated by what would 
colloquially be described as sexism.”245 In his view, that approach is foreclosed by 
the Oncale court’s recognition of a cause of action for male-on-male harassment 
which is “well outside the bounds of what is traditionally conceptualized as sexism,” 
and by the Manhart court’s invalidation of a policy requiring female employees to 
make higher pension contributions than their male counterparts because women 
generally live longer than men, even though “some people might not describe this 
policy as sexist.”246 In any event, the position that sexual-orientation discrimination 
“does not evince conventional notions of sexism . . . is not a legitimate basis for 
concluding that it does not constitute discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”247  
Additionally, Chief Judge Katzmann observed that the Supreme Court has 
rejected the fallback argument made by opponents of the associational discrimination 
approach—that such discrimination can be based only on acts and not on the status 
of sexual orientation.248 That argument fails to comprehend that a Title VII claim 
originates in a challenge to employer discrimination based on an individual’s status 
(a protected characteristic) and not an act.249  
Presenting a different analysis of the associational discrimination theory, Judge 
Lynch’s dissent opined that the associational discrimination at issue in Loving and 
Holcomb “was a product of bigotry against a single race by another” that “is 
expressly prohibited in employment by Title VII.”250 Sexual-orientation 
discrimination is not the same, he argued, as Donald Zarda did not and could not 
plausibly allege that his employer discriminated against him because the employer 
“had something against men, and therefore discriminated not only against men, but 
also against anyone, male or female, who associated with them.”251 He maintained 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. Id. at 125–26. 
 241. “Constitutional cases like Loving ‘can provide helpful guidance in the statutory 
context’ of Title VII.” Id. at 126 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009)). 
 242. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 243. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 126. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 127. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See id.  
 249. See id. at 128. 
 250. Id. at 159 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 251. Id. at 160. 
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that an employer discriminating against gay men is hostile to gay men and not men 
generally, and the animus runs, not against a protected group as in race cases, but 
“against an (alas) unprotected group to which they belong: other gay men.”252  
The flaw in this analysis is Judge Lynch’s focus on the person with whom the 
plaintiff associates instead of the plaintiff who suffered discrimination because the 
employer did not approve of the association. The employer’s animus in the racial 
discrimination context did not run “against all black people (or all white people) but 
against people marrying persons of a different race. “That maps squarely onto 
[Zarda’s] case where the prejudice is not against all men, but people being attracted 
to persons of the same sex.”253 
Judge Lynch argued, further, that his analysis of associational discrimination is 
not foreclosed by Oncale, for he was not maintaining that Title VII prohibits only 
those practices with which the framers of the statute might have been principally 
concerned. He was not surprised that courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit 
sexual harassment as that conduct obstructs women’s entry into and advancement in 
the workplace.254 “[I]t does not matter whether the victim is male or female”; what 
matters is that the victim “is selected by his or her sex” and is disadvantaged because 
of his or her membership in the protected class.255 This “is not a question of what is 
traditionally conceptualized as sexism . . . . It is a question of the public meaning of 
the words adopted by Congress in light of the social problem it was addressing when 
it chose those words.”256  
Judge Lynch’s contention that sexual harassment is not a question of sexism is 
troubling. Sexual harassment is more about sexism than sex,257 includes a number of 
forms of sexism and abuse,258 and “is a technology of sexism. It is a disciplinary 
practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both harasser and victim 
according to a system of gender norms . . . .”259 Admittedly, sexism may not be an 
aspect of the factual backdrop of every harassment claim. But if harassment meets 
Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement, “why the harassment was perpetuated 
(sexual interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) is 
beside the point.”260  
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*** 
The Hively and Zarda majorities and dissents reached contrary conclusions about 
the meaning of “because of sex” as applied to plaintiffs’ claims that they were 
discriminated against because of their sexual orientation. These differences are the 
product of markedly different interpretive approaches yielding, unsurprisingly, 
conflicting statutory interpretations. Recognizing an anti-LGB claim, the Hively and 
Zarda side of the interpretive divide looked to statutory text and juridical and 
doctrinal developments occurring over the past fifty-five years. Declining to 
recognize the claim, the dissenting judges on the other side of the divide insisted that 
the original or central public meaning of “sex” in 1964 is the unchanged meaning of 
“sex” today. As that meaning does not refer to or include “sexual orientation,” the 
Title VII phrase “because of sex” does not encompass anti-LGB discrimination. And 
the Eleventh Circuit’s not-actionable position in Bostock, adhering to binding circuit 
precedent, did not engage with the various rationales offered and disputed in Hively 
and Zarda. This split in authority will remain absent Supreme Court resolution of 
these conflicting constructions of Title VII. 
IV. TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION: BECAUSE OF SEX? 
A. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. 
Aimee Stephens, assigned male at birth, lived and presented as a man while 
working at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes. Her employment was terminated 
after she informed the funeral home’s director that she intended to transition from 
male to female and would present and dress as a woman while at work. Stephens was 
fired, according to the director, because she “was no longer going to represent 
himself as a man. He wanted to dress as a woman.”261 The EEOC filed a complaint 
alleging that the employer violated Title VII by terminating Stephens’s employment 
because of her transgender and/or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sex-
based stereotypes. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the 
transgender discrimination claim on the ground that transgender status is not a 
protected trait under Title VII but denied the motion to dismiss the sex 
stereotyping/gender nonconformity claim.262 In deciding the parties’ cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the district court concluded that although there was direct 
evidence supporting Stephens’s sex-stereotyping claim, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act263 precluded the EEOC’s enforcement of Title VII.264 
The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Karen Nelson Moore, agreed with the 
district court that Stephens was fired because she failed to conform to the employer’s 
sex stereotypes. The appeals court disagreed, however, with the district court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
judgment vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
 261. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 262. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 594, 595 (E.D. 
Mich. 2015). 
 263. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(1)–(6) (2012). 
 264. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. 
Mich. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 884 F.3d 590. 
262 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:227 
 
conclusion that Stephens could not alternatively pursue a discrimination claim based 
on her transgender and/or transitioning status.  
With respect to the sex-stereotyping claim, Judge Moore was guided by the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Salem.265 The Smith court, basing its analysis 
on the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse ruling, held that a transgender person who 
was subjected to adverse working conditions after “he began to express a more 
feminine appearance and manner on a regular basis” could sue the employer under 
Title VII because the challenged “discrimination would not have occurred but for the 
employee’s sex.”266 Firing Stephens because she “‘wanted to dress as a woman’ . . . 
falls squarely within the ambit of sex-based discrimination that Price Waterhouse 
and Smith forbid.”267  
The funeral homes argued that sex stereotyping violates Title VII only when it 
results in the disparate treatment of men and women. Not persuaded, Judge Moore 
pointed out that Smith did not ask whether transgender persons transitioning from 
male to female were treated differently than transgender persons transitioning from 
female to male; rather, the court asked whether a transgender person had been 
discriminated against because of the failure to conform to the employer’s stereotype 
regarding how a man should look and behave.268 On that view, an employer’s 
expectation of conformity by both male and female employees violates Title VII.269 
With respect to the transgender/transitioning status claim, the EEOC and 
Stephens270 argued that transgender discrimination is always based on the gender 
stereotype that individuals will conform their behavior and appearance to their birth-
assigned sex (for example, their dress and the name they use).271 The employer 
countered that the Title VII word “sex” “refers to a binary characteristic for which 
there are only two classifications, male and female,” which arise “in a person based 
on their chromosomally driven physiology and reproductive function,” and that 
transgender status refers to a person’s “self-assigned” gender identity and not their 
sex.272  
For two reasons, Judge Moore concluded that Stephens and the EEOC had the 
better argument. First, it is “analytically impossible to fire an employee based on that 
employee’s status as a transgender person without being motivated, at least in part, 
by the employee’s sex.”273 Second, “discrimination against transgender persons 
necessarily implicates Title VII’s proscriptions against sex stereotyping.”274 As a 
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transgender person is inherently gender nonconforming, discrimination on that basis 
imposes “stereotypical notions of how sexual organs and gender identity ought to 
align”; such discrimination cannot be disaggregated from discrimination on the basis 
of gender nonconformity.275  
Judge Moore also rejected the employer’s physiology, reproductive, and self-
assigned gender identity argument. “[T]he drafters’ failure to anticipate that Title VII 
would cover transgender status is of little interpretive value.”276 Governed as we are 
by the provisions of Title VII and not the principal concerns of legislators,277 
congressional failure to foresee the case of transgender discrimination does not place 
that form of discrimination beyond the reach of the statute.278 As Judge Moore 
concluded, this argument is precluded by Smith and has been “eviscerated by Price 
Waterhouse.”279  
Judge Moore considered an additional employer argument: transgender status is 
not unique to one biological sex as both biologically male and biologically female 
persons can be transgender.280 That is true, Judge Moore said, as biological sex and 
transgender status are not coterminous; however, “a trait need not be exclusive to 
one sex to nevertheless be a function of sex.”281 As Chief Judge Katzmann explained 
in Zarda, Title VII asks not “whether a particular sex is discriminated against,” but 
“whether a particular ‘individual’ is discriminated against ‘because of such 
‘individual’s’ . . . sex.’”282 To reiterate, discrimination against an employee because 
of her transgender status takes into account her biological sex; therefore, that 
discrimination “necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex—no matter 
what sex the employee was born or wishes to be.”283  
Accordingly, the court held that that the EEOC could pursue its claim that the 
employer discriminated against Stephens on the basis of her transgender status and 
transitioning identity.  
B. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company 
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, notable for its concurring opinion, warrants 
mention. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company284 considered Nicole Wittmer’s appeal of 
the district court’s dismissal of her suit alleging that her employer violated Title VII 
when it rescinded an offer of employment because of her identity as a transgender 
woman and her failure to conform to female sex stereotypes.285 Noting Hively, Zarda, 
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and Harris Funeral Homes, the district court assumed that Title VII protected 
Wittmer.286 However, summary judgment was granted to the employer on the ground 
that Wittmer failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.287 
When the case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the employer did not take a 
position on the question whether Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination.288 
Judge James C. Ho’s opinion for the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
Wittmer had not demonstrated a prima face case of sex discrimination.289 He also 
concluded that binding Fifth Circuit precedent in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.290 
foreclosed Wittmer’s claim.291 Although Blum held that “[d]ischarge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII,”292 Judge Ho applied that sexual-
orientation discrimination ruling to Wittmer’s separate and distinct transgender 
discrimination claim.293 
Judge Ho also issued a separate concurring opinion explaining why, in his view, 
the court’s precedent is “correct as matter of faithful interpretation.”294 “As a matter 
of ordinary usage, the term ‘sex,’ of course, does not mean ‘sexual orientation’ or 
‘transgender status.’”295 Citing Judge Sykes’s Hively dissent, he stated that in 1964 
and today the word “sex” means biologically male or female.296  
Asking what it means to discriminate because of sex, Judge Ho set forth out two 
competing schools of thought: (1) the longstanding view that Title VII prohibits 
employment discrimination favoring men over women, or vice versa, and (2) what 
he characterized as the recently adopted view that the statute requires employer 
blindness to an individual’s sex.297 He applied his schools of thought to a subject 
having nothing to do with the case before the court: separate bathrooms for men and 
women.298 Under his anti-favoritism approach, separate bathrooms are lawful 
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because the privacy of both sexes is protected; under his blindness theory, separate 
bathrooms are unlawful because they are not blind to sex.299  
Judge Ho’s schools of thought diverged on the issue of transgender and sexual-
orientation discrimination. Under the anti-favoritism theory, employer 
discrimination against both transgender men and transgender women does not 
discriminate on the basis of sex since men would not be favored over women, or vice 
versa; rather, nontransgender persons would be favored over transgender persons.300 
And discrimination against either gay men or lesbian women favors not men over 
women, but straight men and women over gay men and lesbian women. By contrast, 
he reasoned that under his blindness theory, Title VII would prohibit both 
transgender and sexual-orientation discrimination as “it would not matter that the 
company isn’t favoring men over women, or women over men. All that matters is 
that company policy treats people differently based on their sex: Because only 
women, not men, may identify as women—and only women, not men, may marry 
men—just as only women, not men, may use women’s bathrooms.”301 
Asking how should “a dutiful textualist” should proceed, Judge Ho declared that 
“the traditional interpretation should prevail.”302 In 1964, there was no serious 
contention that “the public meaning and understanding of Title VII included sexual 
orientation or transgender discrimination,”303 and he argued that today’s judicial 
consensus confirms that view. Distinguishing the original public meaning of Title 
VII from the subjective intent of the legislators, he expressed his understanding that 
those opposing the traditional view argue that members of the 1964 Congress would 
not have expected that the statute would prohibit sexual harassment or same-sex 
sexual harassment.304  
But for originalists, the point is not whether members of Congress 
subjectively intended that result—rather, the point is whether they should 
have expected it, in light of the words of the statute as they were 
generally understood at the time. In short, our lodestar is original public 
meaning, not original intent.305  
He argued, further, that no one should be surprised that Title VII, “drafted to 
eradicate sex discrimination in the workplace,” would be interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to prohibit sexual harassment.306 “That of course says nothing about whether 
Title VII also forbids sexual orientation and transgender discrimination.”307  
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Judge Ho labels his approach as original public meaning originalism, the current 
predominant approach among originalist academics and judges.308 But his focus on 
what members of Congress should have expected in 1964 is actually a different 
variant of originalism—original expected applications originalism. The original 
public meaning of a text “is one thing; expectations about how the text will or should 
be applied to particular cases or issues is another.”309 Regarding his argument that no 
one should be surprised by the Supreme Court’s holding that sexual harassment is 
sex discrimination, Judge Ho may be surprised that his own approach can yield an 
interpretation resulting in the recognition of anti-LGBTQ discrimination claims. The 
(his) traditional view of “sex” as male or female is also the view of “sex” in the 
court’s sexual harassment decisions310 and in the recent appeals courts’ decisions 
holding that anti-LGBTQ claims are actionable. This raises the obvious question of 
why the sex-as-biology construction of that statute should not also govern in the anti-
LGBTQ discrimination context.311  
Turning to Price Waterhouse and echoing Judge Sykes’s Hively dissent, Judge 
Ho identified what he perceived to be a problem with the court’s sex stereotyping 
analysis: Price Waterhouse did not make sex stereotyping a per se violation of Title 
VII as Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion spoke only of prohibiting the “disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”312 It is true that Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse did not expressly state that sex 
stereotyping is a per se violation of Title VII. He made clear, however, that while 
stereotypical workplace remarks do not inevitably establish that gender played a part 
in an employment decision, such remarks could be evidence that gender did in fact 
play a part.313 And Judge Ho’s observation that Justice Brennan was only speaking 
of disparate treatment resulting from sex stereotypes simply restates what Justice 
Brennan said in Price Waterhouse. Recall that Justice Brennan instructed that the 
question to be answered on remand was the but-for, disparate-treatment inquiry: 
would Ann Hopkins have been criticized as sharply or at all if she had been a man?314 
Given the Justice’s clearly stated view that sex stereotyping can be evidence of 
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disparate treatment discrimination, Judge Ho has curiously branded as problematic 
something that is not.315 
Having issued a concurring (bordering on advisory) opinion to his own majority 
opinion, Judge Ho wrote that the case before him 
does not simply concern sexual orientation and transgender 
discrimination.  It affects every American who uses the restroom at any 
restaurant, buys clothes at any department store, or exercises at any gym. 
What’s more, because federal statutes governing educational institutions 
employ language indistinguishable from Title VII, this debate also 
affects virtually every school, college, dormitory, athletic activity, and 
locker room in America.316 
This op-ed-like statement and the overreaching dicta and “elegant asides”317 in Judge 
Ho’s maximalist concurring opinion lays down a marker in the current and ongoing 
debate over the legal protections afforded or not provided to LGBTQ persons in and 
beyond the workplace. 
*** 
The contrast between R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes and Judge Ho’s concurring 
Wittmer opinion could not be starker. Judge Moore, guided by the Supreme Court’s 
Price Waterhouse decision and Sixth Circuit precedent, persuasively established that 
transgender discrimination constitutes gender nonconformity discrimination and sex 
stereotyping that would not have occurred but for the employee’s sex. That the 
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drafters of Title VII did not foresee that the statute’s “because of sex” provision 
would cover transgender discrimination was neither here nor there given post-1964 
developments including Price Waterhouse and Oncale.318  
Judge Ho’s Wittmer concurrence gave primacy of place to his understanding of 
the original public meaning of the statutory text. As previously noted, he actually 
applied a different form of originalism—original expected applications—in 
suggesting that in 1964 members of Congress should have expected that Title VII’s 
words would be later interpreted to prohibit sexual harassment. In addition, his effort 
to problematize Price Waterhouse’s sex stereotyping analysis is, for reasons earlier 
noted, unpersuasive and unavailing.319  
CONCLUSION 
In 1964, gays and lesbians “were, literally, considered psychopaths, criminals, 
and enemies of the people” and “presumptive felons”;320 it is thus not surprising that 
the 88th Congress did not mean to protect them from discrimination in employment. 
Fortunately, those mid-1960s views “no longer enjoy respectable support,”321 a 
consequence of “profound changes within society—the constitutionalization of 
privacy rights, the Civil Rights Movement, the women’s rights movement, the 
LGBTQ rights movement, and the racial and gender integration of most workplaces 
and institutions,”322 and the Supreme Court’s recognition of the constitutional right 
to marry a person of the same sex in Obergefell v. Hodges.323  
Obergefell “creates a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be 
married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.”324 That paradox 
would be eliminated by an affirmative answer to the question posed in this Article: 
Is anti-LGBTQ discrimination prohibited by Title VII’s discrimination “because of 
sex” proscription? Yes. That answer best comports with the text of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination provision as construed over the years by the Supreme Court and more 
recently by Hively, Zarda, and R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes, and is the product of a 
jurisprudential approach that does not render invisible or irrelevant more than a half-
century of significant legal developments in Title VII law and policy. Anti-LGBTQ 
discrimination is sex discrimination.  
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